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ARTICLES 
A TALE OF TWO ISLANDS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
COURT OF ARBITRATION'S DECISION IN THE 
CANADA-FRANCE MARITIME BOUNDARY DISPUTE 
EDWARD LlVINGSTONEt 
In carrying out the delimitation of the maritime boundary dispute between 
Canada and the French islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the Court of 
Arbitration was instructed by the parties to apply principles of international 
law. The majoriry of the Court interpreted this instruction as demanding the 
application of equitable criteria to achieve an equitable result. The inconsis-
tencies in the Court's judgment, however, suggest that the majority relied on 
the principle of proportionaliry, and not on equitable criteria, in delimiting 
the boundary. Analyzed from a functional perspective, the decision represents 
an attempt by the Court to produce both a settlement and a demand far co-
operation in the management of the maritime resources at the heart of the 
dispute. 
Lorsque le Tribunal d'arbitrage decida du litige entre le Canada et les ties 
franfaises de St. Pierre et Miquelon quant a la delimitation des ftontieres 
maritimes, les parties indiquerent qu 'elles voulaient etre regies par les 
principes de droit international La majorite du Tribunal interprete ces in -
structions comme autorisant !'application des principes d'equite afin d'obtenir 
un resulta equitable. Cependant, les inconsistances du jugement du Tribunal 
suggerent que la majorite se fonde sur le principe de la proportionnalite lors 
de la delimitation des ftontieres, et non sur les criteres d'equite. En 
l'analysant d'une perspective fonctionnelle, la decision represente une 
tentative du Tribunal d'en arriver autant a une entente qu 'a une demande 
de cooperation des parties a l'egard de !'administration des ressources 
maritimes en litige. 
t B.Sc. (Concordia), M.Sc. (Guelph), LLB. anticipated 1994 (Dalhousie). 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On June 10th 1992 the Court of Arbitration established by Canada 
and France to settle their maritime boundary dispute with respect 
to the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon rendered its decision, 1 
putting an end, on the face of it, to over twenty years of acrimonious 
dispute. In the agreement which sent the matter to judicial 
arbitration, the two countries specified that the Court should rule 
"in accordance with the principles and rules of international law 
applicable in the matter."2 It is claimed by the majority of the 
Court of Arbitration that by using equitable criteria to arrive at an 
equitable result this requirement has been fulfilled. 
This paper is an assessment of the judgment both in light of 
current international law and juridical thought on maritime bound-
ary delimitation, as well as in terms of its legal and logical coher-
ence. Each step of the decision is analyzed in order to draw out the 
principles at work, legal or otherwise. To aid in this task use is 
made of the dissenting opinions of the Canadian and French 
members of the Court. 
While clearly enunciating several equitable criteria upon which 
to base the delimitation of the maritime boundary, the Court ap-
plies them in such a non-rigorous manner as to suggest a decision 
that is based upon a proportionality concept. In the result the Court 
balances uneasily between a stated rule of law and a decision ren-
dered ex aequo et bono. 
In addition to an analysis based on classical legal principles, the 
decision of the court, as well as the dispute in general, will be con-
sidered from a functional perspective. In this regard discussion will 
be centred both on the limits imposed on the Court by the com-
promis, and on any perceived functional aspects of the decision. It 
will be argued that the boundary produced by the Court is deliber-
ately constructed so as to impede control by any one party of the 
1 Court of Arbitration for the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between Canada 
and France: Decision in Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Areas, 31 
I.L.M. 1145 (1992). 
2 Canada-France: Agreement Establishing a Court of Arbitration for the Purpose 
of Carrying out the Delimitation of Maritime Areas Between France and Canada., 
29 I.L.M. 1 (1990), art. 2(1) [hereinafter the compromis]. The compromis also sets 
out the members of the court: Mr. Jimenez de Arechaga (pres.), Mr. Arangio-
Ruiz, Mr. Schachter, Mr. Weil (France), Mr. Godieb (Canada). 
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resources at the heart of the dispute, thereby increasing the proba-
bility and necessity of cooperative management. 
The body of the paper consists of four sections. First, a histori-
cal and contemporary overview of the islands of St. Pierre and 
Miquelon and the associated Canada-France dispute. Second, a de-
scription of the Court's decision, incorporating an analysis of spe-
cific issues raised both by the majority and dissenting opinions. 
Third, a general analysis of the juridical framework used by the 
Court to arrive at its decision; and fourth, a functionalist perspec-
tive on both the dispute and the judgment. 
II.BACKGROUND 
1. Historical Context 
The dispute over the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon stretches 
back almost 400 years to the establishment of the first French set-
tlement in 1604. This was followed by the first British occupation 
in 1702 with the islands subsequently being ceded to Great Britain 
by the Treaty of Utrecht3 in 1713.4 Under the Treaty of Paris5 
of 1763 France regained the islands as her sole possession in what 
had become British North America. The islands were granted to 
France in fulfilment of a request that French fishermen be accorded 
a place of shelter. 6 
Between 1763 and 1816 the islands were occupied by the British 
no less than four times, and four times France regained possession 
under new treaty provisions. The most famous of these being the 
Treaty of Versailles? of 1783 which was accompanied by declarations 
from Great Britain and France stating that the islands should not 
become "an object of jealousy between the two nations."8 
Throughout this period fishing activities by the French were a 
constant source of aggravation between the two countries, princi-
3 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 11 April 1713, France-Great Britain, 27 
Parry's TS 475. 
4 Encyclopaedia Britannica Micropaedia (1984), vol. 10 at 333. 
5 Definitive Treaty of Peace, 10 February 1763, France-Great Britain-Spain, 
42 Parry's TS 279. 
6 Ibid. art. VI. 
7 Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, 3 September 1783, France-Great 
Britain, 48 Parry's TS 437. 
8 Ibid. 
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pally because the French did not restrict themselves to the waters in 
the channel between St. Pierre and Miquelon but fished along a 
considerable length of Newfoundland's coast.9 More importantly, 
France was developing a fishery based not in metropolitan France 
but rather on the islands, with the result that St. Pierre and 
Miquelon were no longer just a refuge, but rather a fully developed 
colony. 
2. The Present Dispute 
The islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon thus have a long and con-
tentious history. The origin of the recent chain of events leading to 
the Court of Arbitration, however, is found in communications by 
Canada to France in 196610 proposing a delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf boundary between St. Pierre and Miquelon and Canada 
on the basis of "special circumstances" under art. 6 of the 1958 
Convention on the Continental Shelf.11 In reply, France insisted on 
the use of equidistance to delimit the boundary, using St. Pierre and 
Miquelon as base-points with minor changes possible in the light of 
"special circumstances."12 This dispute was brought into sharp focus 
later that year when both countries issued competing permits for 
offshore oil & gas exploration on the continental shelf south of St. 
Pierre and Miquelon.13 
Talks on the delimitation of the shelf occurred periodically 
over the next several years, with the delimitation of the territorial 
sea also becoming an issue in 1971 with the extension by Canada 
and France of their territorial seas to 12 nautical miles. 14 During 
this period, Canada was attempting to terminate fishing by foreign 
fleets in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, as a result of which Canada and 
France entered into the 1972 Agreement Between Canada and France 
9 D. W. Prowse, "The Treaty Shore Question in Newfoundland" (1902) 1 Can. 
L. Rev. 329 at 334. 
1° Canada-France, Case Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Areas, 
Canadian Memorial, 107-108, paras 236 and 237 [hereinafter 
11 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UNTS 311. 
12 French aide-memoire, July 29, 1966, Canada-France Case Concerning the 
Delimitation of Maritime Areas, Annexes to the Memorials, vol. 1 at Annex A-3. 
l3 T. McDorman, "The Canada-France Maritime Boundary Case: Drawing a 
Line Around St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1990) 84Am. J. Int'! L. 157 at 159. 
14 Memorial, supra note 10 at 111, para. 252. 
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on Their Mutual Fishing Relations. 15 The result of this agreement, as 
it applies to St. Pierre and Miquelon, is threefold. First, it sets a 
territorial sea boundary16 in the channel between the islands and the 
coast of Newfoundland. The line is primarily an equidistance one 
and consists of eight straight line segments (see Figure 1). Second, 
the agreement provides for reciprocal fishing rights in both 
undisputed and disputed national waters, regardless of any 
subsequent modifications to fishing zones-subject to the caveat 
that Canada can impose such measures as are needed to conserve the 
resource, such as quotas. 17 Finally, the agreement contains a "without 
prejudice" clause enabling either country to make further claims in 
the area. 18 
While the two countries were agreeing on fisheries, progress was 
also being made with regard to oil and gas resources. In 1972, a 
Releve De Conclusions19 was arrived at by officials from both coun-
tries. In it France agreed to a limited continental shelf claim, not 
spelled out, but indicated to be a 12 NM zone, in exchange forcer-
tain economic concessions on the exploration and exploitation of 
the offshore oil and gas resources.20 This compromise was rejected 
by the Canadian cabinet and died a quick death, but France latter 
submitted the Releve to the Court of Arbitration in the Anglo-
French Arbitration21 to support its contention that the Channel 
Islands should be enclaved. 
The delimitation dispute became somewhat more complicated 
in 1977 when Canada and then France proclaimed a 200 NM fishing 
zone (EFZ) and economic zone respectively (EEZ),22 Negotiations 
between the two countries commenced again in 1978, after the end 
of the Anglo-French Arbitration, with France now claiming a strict 
l5 Agreement Between Canada and France on Their Mutual Fishing Relations, 
supra note 12, vol. 1 at Annex D-13 [hereinafter the 1972 Agreemenrj. 
l6 Whether it is the territorial sea or a fisheries zone which is being delimited 
is unclear. 
17 1972 Agreement, supra note 15, art. 2. 
l8 Ibid. art. 9. 
19 Re/eve de conclusions, supra note 12, vol. 1 at Annex B-2 [hereinafter Relevej. 
20 Ibid. arts. I & II. 
21 Case Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, and the French Republic, 18 
R.I.A.A. 3 [hereinafter Anglo-French Arbitration]. 
22 C. R. Symmons, "The Canadian 200-Mile Fishery Limit and the 
Delimitation of Maritime Zones Around St. Pierre and Miquelon" (1980) 12 
Ott. L. Rev. 145 at 152-4. 
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equidistance line as the proper method of delimitation and Canada 
insisting that France was entitled to no more than a 12 NM enclaved 
zone around the islands.23 
Over the next decade, talks were started on numerous occasions 
only to break down. While this period was marked by considerable 
tension between the two countries, worse was yet to come. In the 
mid-1980s, Canada started setting quotas for the cod catch in the 
3Ps fishery subdivision, which included both the disputed zone as 
well as undisputed Canadian waters.24 Together with a private 1984 
agreement that provided for national fisheries laws not to be 
reciprocally applied in the disputed area, the imposition of quotas 
was sufficient to bring the two countries back to the bargaining table 
in 1987. Canada in particular was eager to resolve the boundary 
dispute as it was concerned about the effects of unrestrained French 
fishing-as allowed by the 1984 agreement-on the cod stocks that 
migrated through the disputed waters. 25 
The 1987 talks lead to an agreement in principle to send the 
boundary dispute to arbitration, as well as setting quotas for undis-
puted Canadian waters and laying down a process for the joint de-
velopment of quotas in the disputed zone pending resolution of the 
dispute. 26 This last aspect of the agreement proved to be a complete 
failure, resulting in Canada closing its ports to French fishing 
vessels and France recalling its ambassador. 27 A mediator was 
called in and in 1989 agreement was reached on quotas. In addition, 
France agreed to send the boundary dispute to arbitration on the 
basis of the compromis of March 30th, 1989 in return for a greater 
allowable catch in undisputed Canadian waters. 28 
3. Geographic and Political Environment 
To fully understand the dispute and the judgment it is necessary to 
understand the unique geographical and political situation of St. 
Pierre and Miquelon. The islands are situated west and south of the 
mouth to Fortune Bay, opposite the western coast of New-
foundland's Burin Peninsula. The grouping consists of two main 
23 Memorial, supra note 10 at 116-117, paras. 262-6. 
24 McDorman, supra note 13 at 161-2. 
25 Memorial, supra note 10 at Figure 9. 
26 McOorman, supra note 13 at 163. 
27 Ibid. at 164. 
28 Ibid. 
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FIGURE 1 
Delimitation as per 1972 Agreement 








Adapted by Olivier Fuldauer from C. R. Symmons, "The Canadian 200-Mile 
Fishery Limit and the Delimitation of Maritime Zones Around St. Pierre and 
Miquelon" (1980) 12 Ott. L. Rev. 145at148. 
8 DALHOUSIE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 
FIGURE 2 































Adapted by Olivier Fuldauer from map by Dr. Galo Carrera, Professor Dawn 
Russell, Professor Hugh Kindred, and Professor Phil Saunders, with permission of 
Professor Phil Saunders. 
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islands. The northern island, Miquelon, is actually two islands, 
Grande Miquelon and Langlade29 joined together by a sandy 
isthmus. Neither of these islands have a significant population, the 
total being approximately 800 people. Together, Grande Miquelon 
and Langlade stretch for approximately 22 NM and are almost 7 
NM wide for an area of 215 square kilometres. The southern island, 
St. Pierre, is the main population centre with a population of ap-
proximately 6300. The island is 3 NM south-east of Miquelon and 
has an area of 27 square kilometres. At its narrowest the channel be-
tween the Burin peninsula and St. Pierre is 9 NM wide.3° 
The political situation of St. Pierre and Miquelon has changed 
considerably since the dispute first arose between Canada and 
France. Until 1976, the islands were considered to be French over-
seas territories. From that point until 1985, they were classified as a 
departement of France, a change which brought them within the 
European Economic Community legal regime. In 1985 their status 
was changed once again to that of a territorial collectivity of 
France. This change removed the islands from EEC jurisdiction31 
and can be interpreted as being the first step on the road to 
independence, though it should be noted that there is no other 
evidence to suggest any great likelihood of this happening.32 
III. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS 
1. The Relevant Area 
The Court's first step is to describe the geographical area that it 
considers relevant to the delimitation process. It does this before 
addressing the international law applicable to the dispute (as dic-
tated by the terms of reference). The proclamation of a relevant 
area has the greatest impact on the Court's final resolution of the 
dispute. As stated by the Court, "[g]eographical features are at the 
heart of the delimitation process."33 This is especially true in this 
29 Indicated on some charts as Petite Miquelon. 
30 Supra note 4. 
3 l R. Churchill, EEC Fisheries Law (Hingham, MA: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1987) at 66. 
32 M. R. Blakeslee, "The Distant Island Problem: The Arbitration on the 
Delimitation of the Maritime Zones Around the French Collectivite Territoriale 
of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon" (1991) 21 Ga. J. Int'! & Comp. L. 359 at 378. 
33 Supra note 1 at 1160, para. 24. 
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case, where the concept of proportionality seems to play a decisive 
role.34 
The Court starts by noting that both parties agree that the rele-
vant area is the approaches to the Gulf of St. Lawrence, namely the 
concavity formed by the coasts of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. 
The parties do not agree, however, on which coasts should be taken 
account of to arrive at the total coastline lengths for Canada and St. 
Pierre and Miquelon. These figures are of fundamental importance 
as they are one of the two legs upon which proportionality rests, the 
other being the relevant areas. 
In the eyes of the Court the relevant coasts are the coast of Nova 
Scotia from Cape Canso to Cape North, the dosing line across the 
Cabot Strait from Cape North to Cape Ray, and almost the whole 
southern coast of Newfoundland.35 All these "face the area where the 
delimitation is required, generating projections that meet and 
overlap"36 those of St. Pierre and Miquelon. In particular, the Court 
explains that the rational for including the Cabot Strait closing line 
in the calculation is that it represents Canadian coasts that are less 
than 400 NM away from St. Pierre and Miquelon and whose 
projections would also therefore "meet and overlap."37 
The portion of the Newfoundland coast which the Court ex-
cludes is that lying north and east of the islands, including the 
closing line across Fortune Bay. The Court justifies this omission 
by analogy to the north and east coasts of St. Pierre and Miquelon, 
also excluded, which it says do not face on the area of dispute and 
have already been taken into account by the 1972 opposite-coast 
delimitation between points 1 and 9.38 The logic of this determi-
nation is difficult to accept, as noted by Mr. Gotlieb the Canadian 
judge in his dissent.39 The problem lies in the fact that not only do 
the south and west coasts of Newfoundland that are excluded face 
the area to be delimited, but there is no support for the idea that the 
effect of one coast (here Newfoundland) is limited to delimiting 
the boundary between it and the other coast (here the French 
islands), such that it has no effect on the delimitation of the seaward 
34 See discussion below. 
35 Supra note 1 at 1161, paras. 28-30. 
36 Ibid. at 1161, para. 29. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. at 1161, para. 30. 
39 Ibid. at 1184-85, paras. 18-25. 
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coast of the French islands. The Tribunal in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration made it clear that the coastal zone of France could 
leapfrog the Channel Islands and exist on their far side.4° However, 
while the Court ignores this leapfrog effect with respect to 
Newfoundland coasts facing the French islands, the Court accepts 
this concept when it recognizes the existence of Canada's 200 NM 
EFZ on the "far side" of the French zone where it must be created by 
a leapfrogging effect (see Figure 2). 
With regard to the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, the 
Court considers them to have a coast made up of two straight-line 
segments: down the west coast of Miquelon all the way to the south-
west corner of St. Pierre and from there to the south-east corner of 
the island.41 This contrasts with the Canadian position which 
represented the St. Pierre and Miquelon coast as a single north-south 
straight line segment. 
The significance of the Court's decision not to follow the sug-
gestion of the parties is twofold. First, the Canadian to French 
coastline ratio, as calculated by the Court is 15.3:1, this contrasts to 
ratios of 21 :1 and 6.5:1 put forward by Canada and France respec-
tively.42 With a net change of only 68 NM in the Court's calculation 
of coastal lengths from the Canadian position a significant change in 
the ratios has been achieved via the questionable reasoning described 
above. From this observation comes the second point, strongly lead 
by Mr. Weil in his dissenting opinion, 43 that the calculation of 
ratios based on coastal lengths is so open to variation so as to be an 
exercise of discretion rather than law. For this reason, some have 
seen recent delimitation decisions as limiting the role 
proportionality should play while at the same time recognizing its 
utility. 44 
The final determination of the Court is that St. Pierre and 
Miquelon are in a relationship of adjacency with the south coast of 
Newfoundland. This is an important finding as there is a general 
acceptance of the idea that equidistance is less applicable to lateral 
40 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 91-92, paras. 192-194. 
4! Supra note I at 1162, para. 31. 
42 Ibid at 1206, para. 24, note 19. 
43 Ibid 
44 I. Raileanu, "Equity in Maritime Boundary delimitations: The Gulf of 
Maine Case" (1990-91) 14 Hastings Int'! & Comp. L. Rev. 669 at 698; P. Weil, 
The Law of Maritime Delimitation-Reflections. Maureen MacGlashan Trans. 
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1989) at 75-79. 
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boundaries between adjacent coasts than it is to boundaries between 
opposite ones.45 
2. Terms of Reference and International Law 
The second step the Court takes is an examination of the terms of 
reference contained in the compromis. These terms create the Court, 
delimit the question before it, and set the boundaries within which 
the Court must operate. Two key terms shape the judgment are the 
specification of the applicable rules which must govern the delimi-
tation, and the requested result. 
The rules which the court is to operate under are given in art. 
2(1) of the compromis where it states that the Court shall come to a 
decision "[r] uling in accordance with the principles of international 
law applicable in the matter."46 The requested result is given in arts. 
2(1) and 2(2) where the court is asked to "establish a single 
delimitation which shall govern all rights and jurisdiction which the 
parties may exercise under international law"47 and further that 
"[t]he court shall describe the course of this delimitation in a tech-
nically precise manner."48 
The second of the two key terms, the desired result, is straight-
forward and requires no elaboration by the Court. Canada and 
France take the same road travelled by the United States and 
Canada in the Gulf of Maine Case,49 and look to the Court to pro-
duce a single boundary for both the water column and the seabed. 
While the wisdom of this request is debatable, it places some im-
portant limits on the Court which are discussed later in this paper. 
The Court identifies the fundamental principle of international 
law to be applied to the case as one that "requires the delimitation 
to be effected in accordance with equitable principles, or equitable 
criteria, taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in order to 
achieve an equitable result."5o This is no more than a rewording by 
45 0. Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-Making (Kingston, 
Ont.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988) at 135; Continental Shelf (Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) judgement, IC) Rep. 1985 at 13, 47, para. 62 [hereinafter 
Libya/Malta]. 
46 Compromis, supra note 2, art. 2(1). 
47 Ibid art. 2(1). 
48 Ibid art. 2(2). 
49 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, judgement, 
IC) Rep. 1984 at 246 [hereinafter the Gulf of Maine Case]. 
50 Supra note 1 at 1163, para. 38. 
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the Court of the "fundamental norm" enunciated by the Chamber in 
the Gulf of Maine Case.51 As has been noted this is one, and perhaps 
the only, true common denominator of every maritime delim-
itation.52 
Two more findings which have a significant impact on the 
shaping of the decision are made by the Court at this point. The 
first of these is the rejection of the French contention that art. 6 of 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,53 which stipulates an 
equidistance method, is applicable to the dispute. The Court's rea-
soning is lifted directly from the Chamber's decision in the Gulf of 
Maine Case54 and emphasizes that conventional law having to do 
with the continental shelf has no place in an all purpose delimita-
tion; it would have the effect of making the water column above the 
shelf "a mere accessory of the shelf."55 Moreover, the Court points 
out that even if applicable, art. 6 is in no way a rule of equidistance 
but rather a rule of equidistance and special circumstances.56 
As this case and the Gulf of Maine Case are the only two exam-
ples of judicial "all purpose" delimitations,57 it is impossible to 
draw a definitive conclusion but it is apparent that the accepted law 
is that the 1958 Convention has no role to play in a single delimita-
tion of both the shelf and water column.58 
The second finding of the Court is that the decision of the 
Tribunal in the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitration with respect to the 
treatment of the Channel Islands, where a 12 mile boundary was 
created on the seaward side of the islands effectively enclaving 
them,59 does not have precedential value with respect to the case at 
hand. 60 The latter is distinguished on the grounds that there is no 
proximate metropolitan French coast involved in the manner the 
5! Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 300, para. 112. 
52 Weil, supra note 44 at 160. 
53 Supra note 11. 
54 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 301-303, paras. 116-125. 
55 Ibid. at 301, para. 119. 
56 Supra note 1 at 1163, para. 41. 
57 The boundary drawn in the Guinea/Guinea-Bissau Case, 25 I.L.M. 252 
(1986), was only in part a single all-purpose boundary. 
58 However, this may not be true in the situation where the parties have agreed 
to the construction of more than one boundary line where necessary. In such a 
situation it is possible that art. 6 might be found to apply to the continental shelf 
delimitation. 
59 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 95, para. 202. 
60 Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 42. 
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English coast was with the Channel Islands. The Court holds that 
because of this difference St. Pierre and Miquelon cannot be seen as 
incidental features. 
The Tribunal, however, was willing to treat the Channel Islands 
as incidental features because they accepted France's argument that 
not only were they on the "wrong side" of the median line but that 
they were "wholly detached geographically from the United 
Kingdom."61 Ironically, on the basis of this argument France then 
held up the 1972 Releve reached between itself and Canada as a 
precedent for enclaving the Islands. It is true that the 1977 Tribunal 
accepted this analogy with some reservations, noting that the two 
situations were somewhat different, but in essence the Tribunal 
found that the Channel Islands are distant islands in the same sense 
as St. Pierre and Miquelon and thus were subject to being enclaved. 
If an island grouping only tens of kilometres from its 
metropolitan coast is "detached geographically," then one several 
thousand of kilometres from its metropolitan coast must be as well. 
Considered in this manner St. Pierre and Miquelon are even more 
of an incidental feature than the Channel Islands are. The Court, 
however, ignores this reasoning and rejects any similarity with the 
Anglo-French Arbitration on the grounds that it involved "a delimi-
tation between two mainland, and approximately commensurate, 
coasts."62 
In discussing the applicable principles of international law, the 
Court upholds the primacy of equitable principles and affirms the 
limited role of equidistance in an all purpose delimitation. In 
addition the Court rejects the precedential value of the 1977 Anglo-
French Arbitration with respect to the possibility of enclaving re-
mote islands, even though there is a stronger argument for such a 
treatment of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. 
3. The Equitable Criteria 
As the Court recognizes, it is in the choice of equitable principles or 
equitable criteria that the two parties diverge. Not surprisingly 
Canada and France suggest different equitable criteria from which 
the Court can arrive at what each consider an equitable result. France 
argued for the principle of sovereign equality of States and the 
6l Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 94, para. 199. 
62 Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 42. 
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principle that both mainland and island coasts have the equivalent 
ability to generate coastal zones, and Canada argued for the 
principles of non-encroachment and proportionality. For each prin-
ciple the Court discusses the relevant law as well as the objections 
of the opposing party. 
i. Sovereign. Equality of States 
This principle of sovereign equality of states is raised by France to 
discount two Canadian arguments. The first of these two arguments 
is that St. Pierre and Miquelon are entitled to no continental shelf 
of their own as the islands are superimposed on the Canadian shelf. 
This is a modification of the natural prolongation argument first 
articulated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the North 
Sea Continental Shelf Case. 63 The Court rejects this approach, 
adopting the reasoning of the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case. 
the eastern shelf of North America is a physiographical continuum 
which cannot be divided on a physical basis between nations. 64 
Furthermore the Court emphasizes that the shelf is a juridical 
concept, an argument first recognized in the Anglo-French 
Arbitration. 65 This approach is now dominant and defines the shelf 
by a distance measure instead of according to geo-morphological 
factors. 66 As a juridical concept defined by distance, every coastal 
State has an equal claim to a continental shelf. Finally, the Court 
repeats its argument that as the parties have requested a single all-
purpose delimitation, factors that pertain solely to the shelf are not 
applicable. 67 
The second argument raised by Canada is that the political na-
ture of St. Pierre and Miquelon, as a dependent territory of France, 
requires that it be treated in a different manner from an independent 
State. In response, the Court accepts France's position that the 
63 North Sea Continental Shelf, ICJ Rep. 1969 3 [hereinafter The North Sea 
Case]. 
64 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 273, para. 45; This line of argument was 
first used by the Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitration to reject French 
claims with regards to the Channel Islands, supra note 21 at 91, para. 193. 
65 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 91, para. 191. 
66 This practice has been codified in the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in 21 l.L.M. 1261 
(1982), and recognized in Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 33, para. 33. 
67 Libya/Malta, supra note 45, Section II, "Terms of Reference and 
International Law." 
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equality of states demands that the French islands not be treated in 
a prejudicial manner.68 Firstly, the decision of the Court in this 
regard disagrees with Canada's interpretation of the Libya/Malta 
Case, correctly in this writer's view.69 More importantly, the Court 
distinguishes Canada's second argument based on the Anglo-French 
Arbitration treatment of the Channel Islands7° by stating that all 
coasts in the present case are non-independent island coasts, (i.e. 
from a juridical viewpoint neither Newfoundland or Cape Breton 
are considered part of mainland Canada any more than St. Pierre 
and Miquelon are part of metropolitan France). While true in a 
strict physical sense, a simple glance at any chart makes it clear that 
Newfoundland (which politically includes Labrador) and Cape 
Breton (politically, and by roadway, a integral part of Nova 
Scotia) are in a fundamentally different situation than two islands 
several thousand kilometres from their mainland coast. This 
appears to be more a simple reluctance on the part of the Court to 
"open a can of worms" by discussing political criteria, when an 
equitable result based solely on geographical criteria is possible. 
This approach is consistent with prior case-law that has generally 
glossed over the finer points of political and socio-economic status 
of islands in favour of geography.71 
ii. The Equal Capacity of Islands and Mainlands to Generate Zones 
France asserts the equal capacity of islands and mainlands to gener-
ate coastal zones in order to rebut the Canadian contention that 
coasts have relative capacities to generate zones proportionate to 
their length. The Court rejects this, stating that a coast, no matter 
68 Supra note 1at1165, paras. 48-52. 
69 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 51, para. 72 and also at 42, para. 53 where 
political status is seen as a factor affecting geography. cf McDorman, supra note 
13at187. 
70 Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 21 at 90, para. 190. 
7l See generally treatment of islands in Anglo-French Arbitration, supra note 
21; the Kerkennah Islands in the Tunisia/Libya Case, infra note 89; and Seal 
Island in Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49. For commentary see J. Briscoe, 
"Islands in Maritime Boundary Delimitation" (1988) 7 Oc. Y.B. 14 at 39; D. 
Christie, "From the Shoals of Ras Kaboudia to the Shores of Tripoli: The 
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf Boundary Delimitation" (1983) 13 Ga. J. Int'! 
& Comp. L. 1 at 28. 
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how short, projects a 200 NM EEZ72 and that the proper role for 
proportionality is as an a posteriori test to ensure that a given result 
is equitable. As discussed below, it is questionable whether the 
Court in practice rejects this concept of "relative reach" to the ex-
tent it says. 
iii. Non-Encroachment 
This is the first of two equitable criteria put forward by Canada 
and, as noted by the Court, is one outgrowth of the well established 
natural prolongation principle.73 The Court seems to accept 
Canada's argument that due to the concavity of the relative area, a 
line based on equidistance would lead to excessive cutoff beyond 
the southern coast of Newfoundland, the key coast due to the con-
cept of frontal projections. 
In dissent, Mr. Weil takes exception to this theory of frontal 
projection stating that there is no basis for it at international law. 
He argues that the concept of arcs of circles upon which most 
boundary lines are constructed, that are in turn founded upon the 
more ancient "cannon-shot rule," is evidence of a radial theory of 
coastal projection.74 
The difference between the two approaches seems to be more 
apparent than real. Since any curve can be approximated by a large 
enough set of straight lines, an identical result can be obtained from 
either method, avoiding the absurd result suggested by Mr. Weil 
for an L-shaped coast.75 The concept of frontal projections simply 
seems to support the point that a longer coast (disregarding inden-
tations) must by necessity produce a zone of greater area than a 
shorter coast, regardless of the method used. 
iv. Proportionality as an Equitable Principle 
The second equitable criteria put forward by Canada is that of pro-
portionality, not merely as check on the equity of the final decision, 
but as a criteria upon which to base that decision. In response, the 
72 Supra note 1 at 1164, para. 45. Though not quoted, the basis for this is clearly 
art. 121 (2) of LOSC, supra note 66, which states that islands generate zones in the 
same manner as other land territory. 
73 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 39, para. 46; Weil, supra note 44 at 62: "the non-
encroachment principle lies at the very heart of the delimitation process." 
74 Supra note 1at1201, paras. 12-14. 
75 Ibid. 
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Court reiterates its position that the proper use of proportionality is 
the former and not the latter.76 It sends mixed signals, however, by 
quoting from the Libya/Malta Case wherein it is stated that: 
It is however one thing to employ proportionality 
calculations to check a result; it is another thing to take 
note, in the course of the delimitation process, of the 
existence of a very marked difference in coastal lengths, 
and to at tribute the appropriate significance to that 
coastal relationship, without seeking to define it in 
quantitative terms which are only suited to the ex-post 
assessment of relationship of coast to area. 77 
This passage does not proscribe proportionality as an equitable cri-
teria, instead it advocates limiting the use of proportionality to a 
qualitative role. This contrasts with the quantitative role that pro-
portionality assumes when used as a test of equitable results. Thus 
by deliberately using this quote the Court appears to give with one 
hand what it had just taken with the other, by first stating that pro-
portionality should be used only as a quantitative check, and then 
suggesting that it may also have a qualitative role. 
In the end, the Court accepts all four equitable principles put 
forward by Canada and France as at least relevant to the achieve-
ment of an equitable result. The analysis in the following section 
will examine how these four criteria are used in the Court's solu-
tion, and to what extent any of them dominate the others. 
4. The Court's Result 
The Court states clearly that neither "of the proposed solutions 
[Canada's or France's] provides even a starting point for the 
delimitation."78 With this the Court rejects both equidistance and 
an enclave as methods by which to implement the equitable criteria 
it has identified.79 
76 Ibid. at 1168, para. 63. 
77 Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 49, para. 66. 
78 Supra note 1 at 1169, para. 65. 
79 Note, however, that while not accepting a 12 NM zone around the islands as 
proposed by Canada, the final boundary created by the Court is in fact an enclave; 
France's zone is completely surrounded by the 200 NM EFZ of Canada. 
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t. The Western Sector 
The Court's solution lies in constructing two zones around the is-
lands (see Figure 2). The first it labels the west sector, comprising 
an area from point 9 of the 1972 delimitation to a point off the 
south-west tip of St. Pierre. In discussing this sector, the Court un-
derscores the importance of limiting the cut-off of Newfoundland's 
south-coast projection by encroachment of any zone belonging to St. 
Pierre and Miquelon. To this end the Court grants the islands a 24 
NM zone by analogy to the contiguous zone spelled out in art. 33 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.80 Even this 
amount is not fully given as the zone is not allowed to cross the 
equidistance line where that line is less than 24 NM from the is-
lands, a situation found in the north-west part of the sector. s1 
The strangest aspect of this reasoning is that the Court ap-
proaches the problem from the perspective that the zone around St. 
Pierre and Miquelon should encroach as little as possible on the 
projection from south coast of Newfoundland, but not vice-versa! 
This bias is evident when the Court states that: 
A limited extension of the enclave beyond the territorial 
sea in this western sector would meet to some degree the 
reasonable expectations of France of title beyond the nar-
row belt of territorial sea, even if causing some en -
croachment to certain Canadian seaward projections.82 
Thus while the Canadian projection is protected from severe en-
croachment, the French projection does not seem to enjoy the same 
privilege. This is at odds with the Court's acceptance of the princi-
ples of the sovereign equality of States and the equal ability of 
mainland and island coasts to generate zones. These criteria man-
date that equal weight be given to the concern of Canadian en-
croachment on French projections, yet nowhere in the majority 
judgment is this recognized. 
Mr. Prosper Weil, in dissent, is particularly outraged by this at-
titude which he interprets as an unjustified prejudice on the part of 
the Court, towards France. It is not the Court's job, he asserts, to 
80 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.62/122 (1982) [hereinafter LOSC], reprinted in 21 
I.L.M. 1261 (1982), supra note 1at1170, para. 69. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 1170, para. 68. 
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start from the axiomatic position that the whole of the region is 
Canadian from which some portion should be assigned to France.83 
ii. The Southern Sector 
In the southern sector, there is no concern about encroachment as the 
relevant coasts are parallel (leaving out for the moment any 
consideration of Cape Breton). It is therefore possible to give St. 
Pierre and Miquelon a full 200 NM zone to the south. The Court 
calculates the width of the Southern zone as 10. 5 NM based on the 
distance between the westernmost and easternmost points of the 
island grouping.84 The Court makes no mention of why it does not 
consider the length of the south coast it had previously defined, at 
8.25 NM, as the basis for the corridor. Using this previously de-
fined coastal length would seem a more logical choice given the 
emphasis the Court places throughout the decision on the principle 
that it is coasts that generate maritime zones. 
The Court does not give a rationale for its delimitation of the 
remainder of the southern sector, the area from the north-east tip of 
the corridor to point 1 of the 1972 delimitation. It simply states 
that "the delimitation shall be a twelve nautical miles limit mea-
sured from the nearest points on the baseline of the French islands."85 
No reasons are given as to why a 24 NM zone is not used here, as it 
is in the western sector. There is no equidistance line to limit the 
boundary, and no alternative explanation is put forward to limit the 
French claim in this manner. It is this apparent arbitrariness of the 
decision which most deeply concerns Mr. Weil.86 
With respect to the corridor, the Court is quick to dismiss any 
argument that it is an encroachment on the projection of Cape 
Breton. In the words of the Court, the coast of Cape Breton has 
"open oceanic spaces for an unobstructed seawards projection to-
wards the south ... the direction in which they face."87 This comes 
across as a somewhat original reworking of geography, as noted by 
Mr. Gotlieb in dissent,88 evidently to suit the ends of the Court. 
From Cape North to Scatarie Island the coast follows a general 
83 Ibid. 1203, para. 19. 
84 Ibid. 1170, para. 71. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. 1199 para. 7. 
87 Ibid.171,para. 73. 
88 Ibid. 1189, para. 41. 
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south south-east direction and it is only from Scatarie Island to 
Cape Canso that the coastal direction is south-west. Thus the ma-
jority has effectively ignored the seaward projection of Cape 
Breton's coast from Cape North to Scatarie Island. 
It is suggested that the true principle at work in this particular 
instance is to be found in the separate opinion of Justice Jimenez de 
Arechaga in the Tunisia/Libya Case where he states: 
It is true that there may be geographical configurations in 
which a boundary line cannot avoid "cutting across" the 
coastal front of one State .... If the above-described ge-
ographical situation occurs, then the "cutting-off' effect 
should be allowed to take place at a point as far as it may 
be possible to go, seawards, from the coastal front of the 
affected State [emphasis added].89 
Applying this principle, the minimum cut-off is achieved by a 
north-south corridor, deviation either west or east would involve 
cut-off of Newfoundland's south coast. 
5. A Return to Proportionality 
The Court returns to proportionality at the end of its decision in 
order to carry out the test that it feels is permitted by law when the 
circumstances are appropriate, as it finds they are in this case.90 The 
Court does this by comparing the proportionality of the coasts with 
that of the areas as determined by the delimitation. Central to this 
exercise is the determination of the relevant total area. The Court 
deals with this in few short lines, finding the relevant area as not 
just the Gulf Approaches but the much wider area defined loosely 
by a 200 NM projection from the south-coast of Newfoundland and 
from St. Pierre and Miquelon. In the result a ratio of 16.4: 1 is 
arrived at, a figure that the Court compares favourably to its 
coastline ratio of 15.3: 1.91 
With this result the majority of the Court considers that an eq-
uitable result has been achieved. The two dissenting members how-
ever reach exactly the opposite conclusion, though for somewhat 
89 Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), judgement, ICJ Rep. 
1982, 119, para. 69 [hereinafter Tunisia/Libya Case]. 
90 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 92. 
91 Ibid. 1176, para. 93. 
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different reasons. Mr. Weil's objections are those discussed earlier 
having to do with the arbitrariness of deciding on a relevant area: 
The identification and measurement of the relevant coasts 
and the relevant area remind one of what has been said of 
love, or of a Spanish inn; each one finds in them what he 
brings to it.92 
This attitude, while expressed rather poetically, is borne out by the 
dissent of Mr. Gotlieb who, while also disappointed in the 
arbitrariness of the majority's determination of the relevant area, 
suggests several different methods for arriving at what he considers 
the "correct" relevant area. 93 It is a clear example of the 
discretionary nature of proportionality, the calculation of widely 
divergent relevant areas on what each person considers reasonable 
grounds. 
IV. GENERAL ANALYSIS AND THE HIDDEN RATIO 
1. The Juridical Framework 
There is a continuing debate among international jurists over what 
the law of maritime delimitation actually consists of. It has been 
suggested that true legal rules have not yet evolved and that deci-
sions are on the whole decided ex aequo et bono.94 It is argued that 
this is not only a trend in fact but is also a necessity of any given 
maritime delimitation. Legal rules are not suited to the exercise of 
maritime boundary delimitation as every problem occurs in a 
unique geographical situation that calls for unique treatment and a 
unique solution, a unicum.95 
Perhaps one of the most helpful classifications of the law in-
volved in delimitations has been put forward by Prosper Weil in his 
non-judicial role as an international jurist.96 Weil's classifications 
are based on the degree of normative content in the approach used to 
92 Ibid. 1206, para 24. 
93 Ibid., see generally at 1186-88, paras. 26-37, specifically at 1188, para. 36 
where Mr. Gotlieb considers that the relevant area can only consist of areas of 
ocean that are "near" areas claimed by France. 
94 L. D. M. Nelson, "The Roles of Equity in the Delimitation of Maritime 
Boundaries" (1990) 84 Am. J. Int'! L. 837; Johnston, supra note 45 at 247. 
95 Nelson, ibid. 838-839. 
96 Weil, supra note 44 at 159-167. 
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reach a decision. At the lowest end of Weil' s classification scheme 
are those decisions that are based solely on the "fundamental norm" 
of an equitable result. In this approach, both the criteria and the 
method to be used fall outside the legal sphere and the result is 
determined by what will create an equitable result in the particular 
problem at hand. This is the concept of the unicum carried to its 
logical conclusion: what is equitable in one decision has no bearing 
on what is equitable in the next. 
Carrying out a delimitation via such an approach, it can be ar-
gued, is to truly proceed ex aequo et bono as the content of equity is 
at the discretion of the adjudicator. Yet, insofar as equity is a legal 
concept, international law is still being applied.97 
In the middle of Weil' s scale is the approach that demands an 
equitable result through the use of equitable criteria. With this ap-
proach, equity achieves a normative value to the extent that its con-
tents are defined by the equitable criteria. However, since the 
methods used to move from the criteria to the result are still out-
side of the "rules," and since what is to be considered an equitable 
result is still at the discretion of the court, the end result of 
applying this approach might well differ very little from a decision 
based solely on the "fundamental norm" of an equitable result, save 
to clothe the exercise in an air of objectivity. As the Chamber in the 
Gulf of Maine Case observed: "for one and the same criterion it is 
quite possible to arrive at different, or even opposite, conclusions in 
different cases."98 
The final classification is that of the highest normative content, 
and exists when international law spells out the need not only for 
equitable criteria leading to an equitable result, but also sets the 
method(s) to move between the two. This approach is fundamen-
tally different from the those described above as the court no longer 
has the same freedom to arrive at any boundary it feels is 
appropriate in the circumstances; rather it must follow the legal 
method from a factual starting point and move toward a reasoned 
conclusion. This method admits much less scope for judicial dis-
cretion. 
An example of this approach is the mandatory application of 
equidistance, followed by adjustments in the resulting boundary to 
account for special circumstances. Mr. Weil is one of the strongest 
97 Tunisia/Libya, supra note 89 at 60, para. 71. 
98 Gulf of Maine Case supra note 49 at 313, para. 358. 
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advocates of this approach,99 usually known as the combined rule, 
which state practice has strongly endorsed though adjudicators have 
not.100 
2. The Majority Judgment 
On the face of it the majority judgment fits into the second cate-
gory laid out above. The Court is at pains to justify its decision in 
terms of the equitable criteria it has recognized. Yet, there is in the 
present case a wide and obvious gap between the reasoning of the 
majority, where it exists, and the result. If sovereign equality of 
States is an applicable criteria, where did it disappear to? If non-
encroachment is of such importance, why is the coast of Cape Breton 
ignored as far as it impinges on the corridor? What rationale can 
there be for the 12 NM limit between point 1 of the 1972 
Agreement and the north-east corner of the corridor? In the words of 
Jimenez de Arechaga: 
Often, even, a regrettable but doubtless inevitable gap can 
be observed between the arguments expounded in a 
judicial decision and the concrete finding as regards the 
choice of delimitation line adopted .... The finest legal 
dissertations on equity will never succeed in completely 
eliminating what is perhaps an irreducible core of the ju-
dicial subjectivism .... 101 
It seems clear that either the true rationale behind the judgment 
is an overriding criteria of proportionality, in denial of the Court's 
express position to the contrary, or after arriving at what it consid-
ers an equitable result, the court is attempting an a posteriori appli-
cation of equitable criteria to justify its decisions. In truth, it is 
hard to separate these two positions. Jimenez de Arechaga stated in 
his separate opinion in the Libya/Malta Case. 
In the writer's eyes, there can be no equity without pro-
portionality. The principle of proportionality, with that 
99 Supra note 1at1209-13, paras. 30-37. 
IOO G. J. Tanja, The Legal Determination of International Maritime Boundaries 
(Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation, 1990) at 299-300. 
101 Tunisia/Libya, Separate Opinion of Jimenez de Arechaga, supra note 89 at 
90, para37. 
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of equivalence and finality, is one of the three principles 
on which equity is built. 102 
25 
Thus, if the boundary is arrived at for no other reason than because it 
appears equitable in the eyes of the court, proportionality is still a 
factor in arriving at that view. 
A theory that would explain the piecemeal application of other 
listed criteria is the overriding application of proportionality, but 
if proportionality is the key to the decision, why is the Court so un-
willing to acknowledge this fact in its reasons? Perhaps because the 
preponderance of judicial opinion has dismissed proportionality as 
an equitable criteria. 103 Weil picks up on this in his dissent, and 
makes much of the fact that the majority bases its decision on cri-
teria other than proportionality: 
[E]ven though in some quarters some may think there is an 
impression that this is how the majority of the court 
approached the problem, the fact remains-and this alone 
matters from the legal standpoint-that the pro-
portionality between the lengths of the coastlines and the 
corresponding maritime areas is not the only factor on 
which the Decision bases its solution .... 
. . . [T]he decision is drafted with unfailing orthodoxy 
with regard to proportionality, since it does not make 
proportionality the operative principle for purposes of the 
delimitation and since the line drawn is not claimed to 
be a proportionality line. One cannot but welcome this 
fact.104 
It is disappointing that if proportionality was the underlying 
criteria it was not articulated as such. Certainly this approach is 
open to the charge that the Court rendered a decision ex aequo et 
bono, but to have done so would have recognized what surely is one 
of the axiomatic tenants of maritime delimitation, the principle of 
the unicum. 105 Every delimitation is a unique problem, not only in 
102 Libya/Malta, Separate Opinion of Ruda, Bedjaoui, Jimenez de Arechaga, 
supra note 45 at 84, para. 23. 
103 See Raileanu, supra note 44 at 696-698; McDorman, supra note 13 at 182-
183. 
104 Supra note 1 at 47, para. 20 and at 52, para. 26. 
105 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 290, para. 81. See Libya/Malta, supra 
note 45 at 39 where the ICJ states: "[Equity's] application should display 
consistency and a degree of predictability." 
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the geographical sense but also considering the associated political, 
sociological, economic, and ecological factors. While a general set 
of rules applicable to most if not all situations is seen by many as a 
more secure approach and one more aptly suited to the concept of 
international law, 106 it is in truth ill-suited to the practice of mar-
itime delimitation. As L. D. M. Nelson states: 
[E]ver since the introduction of the doctrine of the conti-
nental shelf it has been maintained that the "infinite va-
riety" of geographical situations effectively rules out the 
application of a general rule .... The persistence of this 
viewpoint leads one to conclude that the law here seems 
to be faced with a stubborn fact of nature. Inevitably, it 
will be the law that will have to accommodate itself to 
this phenomenon, perhaps shedding in the process what 
some consider its most fundamental characteristic, its 
universality, at least as far as a the delimitation of mar-
itime boundaries is concerned.107 
One need look no further than state practice to find evidence of 
the need for flexibility and compromise that maritime 
delimitation demands. 108 The functional approach is an example of 
a dispute resolution framework that recognizes these realities and 
attempts to address them. 
V. THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
The functional approach to maritime boundary delimitation is a re-
cent development in the law of the sea and has been advocated 
primarily by Doug Johnston. 109 The heart of this approach is the 
recognition that maritime boundaries are primarily "resource-ori-
ented rather than area-oriented."110 A few simple examples include 
l06 See generally Weil, supra note 44; Johnston, supra note 45. 
107 Nelson, supra note 94 at 842. 
l08 Examples include the Australia-Papua New Guinea Torres Strait Treaty, 
18 1.1.M. 291 (1979); Iceland-Norway: Agreement on the Continental Shelf 
Boundary Between Iceland and fan Mayen, 21 1.1.M. 1222 (1982); the 
Netherlands-Venezuela 197 8 Boundary Accord, Limits in the Seas, No. 105 
(1986); the French-Venezuelan 1980 Boundary Accord, 1983 Recueil des Traites 
No. 6(13); the 1971 Italy-Tunisia Agreement, Limits in the Seas, No. 89 (1980). 
l09 K. P. Beauchamp, "The Management Function of Ocean Boundaries" (1986) 
23 San Diego L. Rev. 611; Johnston, supra note 45. 
HO Beauchamp, Ibid. at 630. 
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the British objection to the Norwegian practice of straight 
baselines; the North Sea continental shelf delimitation between 
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands; and the Gulf of Maine 
delimitation between Canada and the United States. In each of 
these cases the true dispute was over the partitioning of resources in 
the disputed area, whether it be fish, oil, or scallops. The aim of the 
functional approach is to arrive at a solution to the delimitation 
problem which deals with the conflict over exploitation of the re-
source(s) in question. To quote Beauchamp: "Boundaries drawn on a 
functional basis anticipate purposes and consequences."111 In short the 
aim is to have form follow function, not geography. 
In contrast, the "legal" approach analyzed in the previous section 
focuses solely on geography to the exclusion of almost all other 
factors. 112 The Court is quick to emphasize that "economic de-
pendence and needs were not taken into account in the process of 
delimitation." 113 This is not to say that all non-geographic factors 
are ignored but the exceptions tend to be limited to security and 
shipping concerns. 114 The rationale behind such a limiting rule is 
twofold. First, the courts are not seen as having sufficient expertise 
in these areas, and second, to allow such considerations would re-
move all certainty from the delimitation process by moving away 
from accepted normative values and instead applying a unicum ap-
proach.115 
It should be emphasized that not all disputes are open to a 
functional interpretation. A classic example of one which at least 
started off in this category is the Beagle Channel dispute between 
Argentina and Chile. Though resources, specifically oil and gas, 
came to play a key role, the problem was in essence territorial and 
political in nature.116 
Ill Ibid. 
112 See general discussion in Weil, supra note 44 at 258-264 and McDorman, 
supra note 13 at 184. Concerning the exclusion of economic development 
arguments in particular see Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 41, para. 50. 
113 Supra note 1 at 1173, para. 83. 
114 See Weil, supra note 44 at 264-66. 
ll5 Supra note 1 at 1212, para. 36; Libya/Malta, supra note 45 at 90, paras. 35-37. 
116 See generally F. V., Comment, "The Beagle Channel Affair" (1977) 71 Am. 
J. Int'! L. 733, and Johnston, supra note 45 at 192-196. 
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1. The Dispute From a Functional Perspective 
In its emphasis on the function of boundaries, the functional ap-
proach stresses the importance of negotiation over third party ad-
judication. With third party adjudication, invariably greater em-
phasis is placed on legal rules and issues rather than the functional 
issues at the heart of the boundary dispute. 117 
Recognition of the importance of negotiation can be found in 
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf118 and the LOsc,119 
both emphasize that negotiation is the preferred method of 
resolving boundary disputes/delimitations. As has been pointed out 
by Russell, 120 both Canada and France seemed well aware of the 
advantage of a negotiated solution, and pursued this avenue until the 
late 1980s. However, when a decision was made to send the dispute 
to a Court of Arbitration the countries deliberately limited the 
role of the Court, both by demanding that a single boundary be 
established for the shelf and the water column and by asking the 
Court to follow principles of international law. The second 
condition effectively limits the Court to considering geographical 
factors while ignoring the functional concerns. 121 The first condition 
meanwhile severely curtails the extent to which any solution can 
address both of the fundamentally different management concerns 
of the two resources in dispute: fisheries, and oil & gas. One 
resource being highly migratory in nature while the other is at fixed 
locales on the seabed. 
Johnston and Saunders have commented on the greater flexibil-
ity inherent in arbitration as compared to the ICJ (or a chamber 
thereof) .122 This arises because the parties to a dispute are free to 
establish any terms of reference they see fit for an arbitral tribunal: 
they are not bound by the strictures of international law. Having 
said that, it is clear that in the present dispute Canada and France 
117 Johnston, supra note 45 at 237. 
118 Supra note 11, art. 6. 
l19 Supra note 80, arts. 15, 74, 83. 
120 D. Russell, "International Ocean Boundary Issues and Management 
Arrangements" Vander Zwaag, ed., Canadian Ocean Law and Policy (Markham, 
Ont.: Butterworths Canada, 1992) 463 at 487. 
121 Supra previous section. 
122 D. Johnston & P. Saunders, "Ocean Boundary Issues and Developments in 
Regional Perspective" in D. Johnston & P. Saunders, eds., Ocean Boundary 
Making: Regional Issues and Developments (New York: Croom Helm, 1988) 313 
at 338. 
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deliberately limited the discretion of the Court via the terms of 
reference by mandating the application of principles of 
international law. By limiting the terms in this way it appears as 
though the parties have attempted to achieve a procedure with 
somewhat predictable, and especially dispositive, results. Such an 
approach is attractive because it permits los politicos to return to 
their constituents with a judgment in their pockets and the problem 
apparently solved. 
2. The Decision From a Functional Perspective 
The need to arrive at a functional solution has lead Johnston to em-
phasize the desirability of constructs such as shared management 
zones to accompany any boundary delimitation. This is the concept 
of settlement and arrangement: a given decision should not only 
lead to a settlement of the boundary based on relevant criteria 
(those at the heart of the boundary's function) but should also pro-
vide for a functional arrangement, usually some type of cooperative 
management agreement. 123 Such an arrangement may be integral to 
the settlement, but it is more often the case that it must be ne-
gotiated separately at a later date. It is for this reason that a bound-
ary arrived at through third party adjudication is often only the first 
step in arriving at a functional solution. 124 
As noted, the parties ruled out the possibility of the Court ar-
riving at a functional solution directly. It remains to be seen what 
evidence can be found in the decision of the Court nonetheless at-
tempting to recognize the functional philosophy, both in terms of a 
consideration of relevant factors and with regards to an arrangement 
to accompany the settlement. 125 
As between Canada and France there is no question that it was 
serious disagreements over resource exploitation and management, 
in particular the cod fisheries, 126 that were at the heart of the dispute. 
123 Johnston, supra note 45 at 228. 
124 Russell, supra note 120 at 489. 
125 At least one member of the majority, Oscar Schachter, has written on such 
functional themes as regional cooperation and international organization. See 
0. Schachter, Sharing the World's Resources (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977). 
126 Though certainly given less weight on the face of it, the hydrocarbon 
resource is undoubtedly of longer term interest to France, a country with almost 
total dependence on foreign oil. See generally N. Lucas, Western European 
Energy Policies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) at 1-62. 
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Although oil & gas exploration concerns initiated the debate, it was 
the inability of the parties to agree on management of the cod 
fishery that led ultimately to the Court of Arbitration. The Court 
is willing to recognize this fact127 but limits itself to applying the a 
posteriori test set out by the Chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case: the 
delimitation should not be so radically inequitable so as to lead to 
catastrophic economic repercussions for one of the parties 
concerned. 128 
The Court states that the delimitation will not have a radical 
impact as the 1972 Agreement will still govern the fishery resource 
between the two countries. 129 Of course, in saying this the Court is 
forced to acknowledge the problems which have been encountered 
by the two countries in applying this agreement, but the Court goes 
on to state: 
This Court is confident that by abiding in good faith 
with the 1972 Agreement, the Parties will be able to 
manage and exploit satisfactorily the fishing resources of 
the area. 130 
This appears to be the Court's response to any argument for an 
"arrangement:" the 1972 Agreement is already in place, and all it 
requires is the parties' cooperation. 
As for considering relevant functional criteria in delimiting the 
boundary, criteria based on ecological, biological, and socio-eco-
nomic factors, the Court expressly denies taking them into ac-
count.131 These protestations are suspect, however, when one con-
siders the dominant role that proportionality seems to have played 
in arriving at a solution. It is difficult to imagine how a considera-
tion of the proportionality of certain geographical factors (such as 
disproportionate coastal lengths) cannot help but snare certain as-
sociated socio-economic factors related to the resource in question 
(e.g. more coast = more coastal communities = greater population = 
more of a demand on the resource). In addition, considering the gap 
between reasons and result, and the express recognition of the 
fisheries as an area of concern, it would seem naive to argue that such 
factors did not enter into the Court's consideration. 
127 Supra note 1at1173-74, paras. 83-87. 
128 Gulf of Maine Case, supra note 49 at 342, para. 237. 
129 Supra note 1 at 1174, para. 87. 
130 Ibid 
131 Supra note 1 at 1173, para. 83. 
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Nonetheless, on the face of it the Court abides by the terms of 
reference that preclude any recourse to a functional approach. It is 
satisfied with using the broad brush of proportionality to justify its 
conclusions, while at the same time emphasizing to the parties the 
need to cooperate in their continuing implementation of the 1972 
Agreement. 
Such a conclusion, however, is insufficient to fully explain the 
strange shape of the boundary which the Court arrives at. Certainly 
the area is dictated by proportionality, but there is evidence of an-
other concern in the construction of the shape of the delimited area, 
specifically in the creation of the 200 NM corridor. It is not 
difficult to imagine that this feature raises serious fisheries 
management concerns, particularly for Canada. The corridor 
represents a 10.5 NM wide swath of French jurisdiction where the 
French are free to fish at will. An endangered cod stock that 
transverses the boundaries of the original disputed area will traverse 
this zone. On the French side, a corridor only 10.5 NM wide makes 
the probability of violating the boundary during fishing operations 
very high. In short, the existence of the corridor will require either a 
ridiculous level of scrutiny to enforce and avoid confrontation, or 
the two countries will be forced to adopt a more cooperative stance, 
an imperative that the Court has recognized. It is suggested that it 
is with this functional result in mind that the Court has set the shape 
of the boundary. 132 
If this is true, has the Court, albeit through indirect means, 
reached a functional solution? Johnston and Saunders have the fol-
lowing to say about the required test: 
The new conceptual framework for ocean boundary mak-
ing should require the analyst to ask one all-important 
question: is the boundary functional or dysfunctional? 133 
It is suggested that within the limits imposed by the parties, the 
decision of the Court is functional to the degree that it favours the 
possibility of a cooperative management of the fisheries. However, 
considering the history of the dispute there is likely an equal, if not 
greater, probability that relations between Canada and France will 
spiral even further downwards. There is certainly no evidence to 
132 This possibility was brought to the attention of the author through 
communication with D. Johnston. 
133 Johnston & Saunders, supra note 122 at 332. 
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suggest that a new day of cooperation has dawned between these two 
nations. 134 
With respect to oil & gas resources in the region, there is no 
evidence to suggest any recognition by the Court of the concerns 
surrounding their future management and exploitation. Indeed, the 
Court states that it "has no reason to consider the potential mineral 
resources as having a bearing on the delimitation." 135 This seems a 
cavalier attitude to take when in the eyes of many, the main reason 
that France has remained committed to St. Pierre and Miquelon is 
not because of the fishery but rather the potential hydrocarbon re-
serves beneath the shelf.136 
However, the reasoning applied above with respect to the cor-
ridor and the fisheries may be equally applicable to the hydrocar-
bon resource. While it is true that some of the profitable reserves 
may be located under that part of the shelf caught by the corridor, it 
is likely that any field in the area will straddle the boundary. This 
suggests that any future development of a given straddling field 
will involve exploitation by both countries, thus increasing the prob-
ability of cooperative management of the resource. 
Evidence of the willingness of the two parties to compromise on 
this issue is somewhat more conspicuous than it is with the fisheries. 
While summarily dismissed by the Court, 137 the significance of the 
Releve is not minimal. It is an indication of the importance that 
France ascribes to the hydrocarbon resources that they were willing 
to concede large areas of their continental shelf claim (most of 
which has no oil & gas potential) in return for exploration and ex-
ploitation guarantees. This indicates that a negotiated settlement in 
this area may be possible. In light of this, it is disappointing that 
the Court did not, at a minimum, stress the need for cooperative 
management of both fisheries and hydrocarbon resources. 
l34 For a single example among many, see John C. Crosbie, Minister of 
Fisheries and Oceans, News Release NR-HQ-93-04, (14 January 1993), 
commenting on French misinformation on reduced cod quotas. 
135 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 89. 
I36 McDorman, supra note 13 at 161; M-C. Aquarone, French Marine Policy in 
the 1970s and 1980s, 19 Oc. Dev. & Int'! L. 267 at 276 (1988); Gass, J.D. The 
French Claim to the Eastern North American Continental Shelf, 27 JAG J. 367 at 
384 (1973). 
137 Supra note 1 at 1175, para. 91. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The decision of the majority of the Court of Arbitration in the 
Canada-France maritime boundary dispute claims to be based on 
the application of equitable criteria to arrive at an equitable result. 
The four listed equitable criteria are the sovereign equality of 
states; the equal ability of island and mainland coasts to generate 
coastal zones; and the principle of non-encroachment. Of these the 
principle of non-encroachment is relied upon primarily to limit the 
entitlement of France to an EEZ, in apparent defiance of the 
principle of sovereign equality. 
The Court rejects both an equidistance line as a starting point as 
well as a limited enclave around the islands. In their place the 
Court constructs a two-sector boundary consisting of a 24 NM zone 
about the western side of St. Pierre and Miquelon and a 200 NM 
long 10.5 NM wide corridor extending to the south of the islands. 
The result is justified as being equitable through a comparison of 
the proportionality of coastal lengths to resulting areas. 
The apparent degree of inconsistency on the face of the judg-
ment forces one to conclude that the Court arrives at its decision 
using proportionality as the unstated, but overriding criterion. Such 
an approach is very close to the line separating equity as a legal 
norm from a decision rendered ex aequo et bono. In following this 
path the Court implicitly applies the concept of the unicum, and ac-
cepts the limitation this imposes on the application of normative 
rules of maritime delimitation law. 
An alternative to the classical mode of maritime boundary de-
limitation is the functional approach. With this method the aim of 
the delimitation exercise is to arrive at a boundary that is assessed 
not on territorial concerns but rather on the resources that form the 
basis for the boundary's function. 
When viewed in light of the functional approach, the decision of 
the majority reflects an effort, within the bounds set by the parties, 
to arrive at both a settlement and an arrangement (by creating a 
boundary configuration that encourages cooperation between the 
parties in the management of both the marine and hydrocarbon re-
sources). 
Like the jurisprudence that has preceded it, this decision will be 
a disappointment to those with a unitarian view of international law. 
Notwithstanding several limited exceptions, the Court does not 
take a declarative role towards the rules of law to be applied to 
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maritime boundary delimitation. Once again, the unique nature of 
this type of exercise has forced a Court to exercise flexibility in or-
der to satisfy "the primordial requirement of achieving an overall 
equitable result."138 
138 Tunisia/Libya, supra note 89 at 82, para. 114 
